|Arizona||Arlene L on behalf of her children (P), v. DCS (D)||2014||Court of Appeals of Arizona, Division 1||Whether DCS can update children's vaccines over parental religious objection||There was a compelling state interest sufficient to override the mother's objections and granted DCS authority to vaccinate her children||There is an exception for matters of “great public importance” typically applies when the matter “will have broad public impact beyond resolution of the specific case.”|
|Arizona||Diana H. (P),|
S. Rubin, et al"
|2007||Court of Appeals of Arizona, Division 2||Whether Department of Economic Security has authority to consent to immunizations for dependent nine-month-old child, over mother's objections, on the ground that they were medically necessary and in child's best interest.||Department failed to articulate a compelling interest in immunizing dependent child sufficient to override mother's objection to procedure.||Parents have right to religious upbringing of their children but those rights are not absolute because state also has interest in health and welfare of the child. If the state interest is great enough, e.g. the child's welfare is seriously jeopardized- the state may act and invade the rights of the family|
|Arkansas||"Ulyess Wright et al., (P)|
DeWitt School Dist. No. 1 of Arkansas County, Ark., (D)"
|1965||Supreme Court of Arkansas||Whether school district can enforce regulation requiring students to be vaccinated against smallpox by parents whose religious beliefs contravened the requirement.||State health regulation which required all students to be vaccinated against smallpox as prerequisite to attending school was a reasonable regulation and did not violate constitutional right to free exercise of religion.||And neither rights of religion nor rights of parenthood are beyond limitation. Acting to guard the general interest in youth's well being, the state as parens patriae may restrict the parent's control by requiring school attendance, regulating or prohibiting the child's labor, and in many other ways. Its authority is not nullified merely because the parent grounds his claim to control the child's course of conduct on religion or conscience. Thus, he cannot claim freedom from compulsory vaccination for the child more than for himself on religious grounds. The right to practice religion freely does not include liberty to expose the community or the child to communicable disease or the latter to ill health or death.’|
|Maine||N/a||2005||Supreme Judicial Court of Maine||Whether DHHS can approve child for vaccination against mother's wishes, when the mother put child in circumstances of jeopardy||The lower court's decision to place child in Dept's custody and order to Dept to have child undergo full medical evaluation and to approve vaccinations for child deemed appropriate by pediatrician, against mother's wishes, was not appealable.||Such an order gives the Department “full custody of the child subject to the terms of the order and other applicable law. and to make arrangements for the child to have a full medical evaluation, including an evaluation of his hearing and hernia, and approve such vaccinations as are deemed essential by the pediatrician. Applicable law provides that the custodian of a child has, among other rights, the right to make medical decisions—including vaccination decisions—concerning that child.|
|Massachusetts||"Beulah G. Dalli et al. (P)|
Board of Education et al. (D)"
|1971||Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts||whether state can limit religious exemptions to those of a "recognized" religion||A statute exempting from vaccination requirements those objectors who subscribed to the ‘tenets and practice of a recognized church or religious denomination’ was violative of First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and of state constitutional provisions in extending preferred treatment to adherents and members of recognized church or religious denominations while denying exemption to others objecting to vaccination on religious grounds.||1) limitation of religious exemptions to certain denominations is a violation of the 14th amendment 2) religious exemptions allowed if not a case of emergency/outbreak|
|Massachusetts||Sarah Prince (P) v. Massachusetts (D) ||1944||Supreme Court of the United States||Whether child labor laws infringed upon practice of religion for Jehovah's Witnesses who distribute religious literature on the streets||State can limit the conduct of children (publicly proclaiming religion on the street) beyond the scope of authority over adults||Parents may be free to become martyrs themselves. But it does not follow they are free, in identical circumstances, to make martyrs of their children before they have reached the age of full and legal discretion when they can make that choice for themselves. Thus, he cannot claim freedom from compulsory vaccination for the child more than for himself on religious grounds. The right to practice religion freely does not include liberty to expose the community or the child to communicable disease or the latter to ill health or death.|
|Mississippi||"Charles H. Brown et al. (P)|
Joe A. Stone, Houston Municipal Separate School District, et al. (D)"
|1979||Supreme Court of Mississippi||Whether father can compel school district to admit child to school without completing immunization requirements||(1) statute requiring immunization against certain diseases before school admission served overriding and compelling public interest; (2) to extent statute could conflict with religious beliefs of parent, interest of school children prevailed; (3) statute was reasonable and constitutional exercise of police power; and (4) provision of statute providing exception for immunization requirement based on religious beliefs was in violation of equal protection clause.||If the religious exemption from immunization is to be granted only to members of certain recognized sects or denominations whose doctrines forbid it, and, as contended by appellants, to individuals whose private or personal religious beliefs will not allow them to permit immunization of their children, to this extent the highly desirable and paramount public purpose of the Act, that is, the protection of school children generally comprising the school community, is defeated.|
|Nebraska||Douglas County, Nebraska, appellee; Josue Anaya and Mary Anaya, husband and wife, as parents of Rosa Ariel Anaya, a minor child, appellants."||2005||Supreme Court of Nebraska||Whether state could compel mandatory newborn screening over parental wishes||The court affirmed the district court's ruling that the state had a compelling interest, applying rational basis review, in screening infants for metabolic disease which as not outweighed by parents' religious beliefs.||The parents argued that the statute infringed upon their 1st and 14th amendment rights. The STate had an interest in the health and welfare of all children born in Nebraska and the purpose of the statute at issue was to protect the health and welfare of the children.|
|Nebraska||Jessica Maack et al., appellants; School District of Lincoln, in the County of Lancaster, in the State of Nebraska, also known as School District No. 1, Lancaster County, Nebraska, et al., appellees||1992||Supreme Court of Nebraska||Whether school can exclude unimmunized children during a contagious disease outbreak||Affirmed the board of education's decision to uphold the superintendent's exclusion of unimmunized students from school.||During an outbreak of measles, unimmunized students were not permitted to attend classes. Under the rational basis test, the exclusion did not violate the unimmunized students' equal protection rights because the insufficiently immunized students who were allowed to attend had only a 15% infection rate.|
|New Jersey||June G. Valent, Appellant; Board of Review, Department of Labor and Hackettstwon Community Hospital, Respondents||2014||Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division||Whether hospital wrongfully terminated an employee for failing to get a flu vaccine on secular grounds when other individuals are given religious exemptions.||Reversed judgment denying unemployment benefits to appellant because her secular decision to be exempt from the flu vaccine did not rise to the level of misconduct conceived under N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(b). Employer's flu vaccination policy violated claimaint's freedom of expression by permitting employees with religious exemptions to work without a vaccine and without a mask, but did not provide this option to employees abstaining from the flu vaccine for non-religious reasons.||Appellant refused to be vaccinated for the flu, did not claim a religious exemption, wore a face mask, but had her employment terminated. Employees who had a religious exemption were permitted to work without a mask and without a vaccine.|
|New York||JJames P.B. Lynch, Ann Lynch, as Guardian for Christie Lynch v. Clarkstown Central School District, et al||1992||Supreme Court, Rockland County, New York||Whether school properly denied student admission because student was not immunized and presented a doctor's note stating that student's Rett's disease made immunization harmful.||Held: (1) school district did not act in arbitrary or capricious manner in determining whether child suffering from Rett Syndrome was entitled to medical exemption from immunization requirement; (2) school district was not required to accept physician's note prohibiting immunization w/o investigation; (3) district's denial of medical exemption from immunization was rationally based (no medically recognized contraindication to immunizing Rett children)||The hospital's doctor argued that exemption should be denied because child's disease was not related to meningitis and no causal relationship exists between meningitis and Rett Syndrome. The doctor also testified that child's autoimmune system is competent and that the benefits of immunization far outweigh the risks in a seizure-prone child. Petitioner's doctor testified that his opposition to vaccination was religious not medical.|
|New York||Derrick L. Bowden v. Iona Grammar School||2001||Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York||Whether grammar school could refuse to recognize child-student's claim of religious exemption to state immunization requirements and prohibit child-student from attending classes.||Held: (1) religious exemption was applicable to private and parochial schools; (2) child could assert COA to enforce right to religious exemption from immunization; (3) child entitled to preliminary injunction on first amendment grounds||Plaintiff, a member of the Temple of the Healing Spirit, a religion which is opposed to immunizations, refused to be vaccinated and presented a letter from his pastor. The school denied plaintiff's request because they claimed plaintiffs were not members of a "bona fide recognized religious organization."|
|New York||William Maier v. Paul Besser, Fabius-Pompey Central School District||1972||Supreme Court, Onondaga County, New York||Whether child of Christian Scientist Way receive a statuory exemption from immunization requirements from school||Held: child can qualify for statutory exemption from immunization requirements if the parent has genuine and sincere religous belief which he actively practices and follows and whic is in reality substantially similar to the Christian Scientist faith.||Father argued that his three children were not immunized because of their religoius beliefs, similar to Christian Scientists' beliefs. The Father admits they were not "members" of the Christian Scientist Church. He argues that it is an unconstitutional infringement upon his rights to force them to join an organized religious body in order to practice their religious beliefs without governmental interference.|
|New York||In the Matter of Isaac J; Administration for Children's Service; Joyce J.||2010||Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York||whether a parent is entitled to the religious exemption from the Public Health Law's child immunization requirements||Held: Mother was not entitled to the religious exemption from the Public Health Law's child immunization requirements||Administration for Children's Services argued that mother had neglected child and child should be immunized. They argued the mother failed to provide the child with adequate medical care. Mother could not prove that her opposition to immunization "stems from genuinely-held religous beliefs."|
|New York||Erving R. Brown, Parent of Ysreen Brown v. City School District of the City of Corning||1980||Supreme Court, Steuben County, New York||Whether school district properly denied student from attending classes at public school because her parents claimed a religious exemption from immunization mandates.||Held: (1) the parent's reliigous beliefs were genuine and sincere; (2) no clear and present danger of communicable disease; (3) parent was entitled to exemption contained in Public Health Law relieving him of obligation to obtain immunizations for his daughter.||Plaintiff testified that he had never received immunization himself and that his parents and grandparents had not received immunization for religious reasons. He believes that receiving manmade chemicals by inoculation or immunization will prevent him from attaining the hereafter, and he cites the Bible as support for his belief.|
|New York||In re Elwell||1967||New York Family Court||Whether the state has the authority to compel polio vaccine in order to attend school and exclude unimmunized children||objection was not because of religion but because of "personal opinions, fears unsupported by any competent medical proof, and a purported exercise of their own consciences which would not interefer with their free exercise of the tenets of the Methodist Church.||Father claimed religious objection to vaccines and in particular polio vaccine. State statute made vaccines mandatory for school.|
|New York||McCartney v. Austin||1968||New York Appellate Division||Whether statute compelling immunization for school was limitation on exercise of religion and/or discriminated against father's religion||held: (1) plaintiff's beliefs were actually based on a "personal moral code or philosophy not based on or by reason of religious training, belief or conviction"; (2) denied exemption to Roman Catholic parents because the religion did not oppose immunization||Father claimed religious objection to vaccines (polio) and that his kids should get an exemption to attend scho|
|North Carolina||State v. William H. Miday||1965||Supreme Court of North Carolina||Whether father was justified by teachings of his religious organization in refusing to permit vaccination and immunization of his child||Conviction for failure to send child to school was reversed. New trial granted.||Father was within his rights according to religious teachings and his own convictions to deny children vaccinations.|
|Oklahoma||Donald Dewayne Moore v. Warr Acres Nursing Center, LLC.||2016||Supreme Court of Oklahoma||Whether nursing home-defendant improperly terminated employee-nurse's employment because employee-nurse contracted influenza.||Held: (1) public policy exception to at-will employment existed to prohibit employee from being fired from nursing home solely for not working while infected with influenza virus; (2) summary judgment not appropriate||The District argued that participation in interscholastic sports is only a privilege and is not a constitutionally protected interest.|
|Oregon||In the Matter of M.M v. Department of Human Services||2013||Court of Appeals of Oregon||Whether department of human services could order immunization of eight children despite parent's religious objections.||Held: (1) statutory provisions allowing immunization exemptions for school did not grant parents a right to exempt their children from immunizations if the Department had acquired custody/guardianship over the children; (2) Custodian/guardian of children, here the Department, has the broad authority to make health-care decisions for children; (3) order to allow immunization did not violate parents' rights to direct upbringing of children||The legal custodian of a ward is responsible for the physical custody of the war and must provide the ward with necessaries, care, education and discipline. The legal custodian has the authority to approve "ordinary medical, dental, psychiatric, psychological, hygienic or other remedial care and treatment for the ward, and, in an emergency where the ward's safety appears urgently to require it, to authorize surgery or other extraordinary care."|
|Pennsylvania||Zachary Calandra v. State College Area School District and State College Area School Board||1986||Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania||Whether student's religious beliefs were violated because school required tetanus immunization as a condition for participation in interscholastic baseball||Held: school board's requirement that any student who wishes to participate in interscholastic sports receive tetanus immunization did not place impermissible burden on student whose religious beliefs opposed immunization; participation in interscholastic sports did not rise to level of important government benefit.||Student argued that the requirement for tetanus vaccine before participation in school sports violated his freedom of religion and expression.|
|South Carolina||Tracy Lynn McCall, James Timothy McCall v. DHEC (Department of Health and Environmental Control)||1993||Court of Appeals of South Carolina||Whether Department had duty to give child certain vaccines or grant exemptions from immunization requirements.||Held: Department had no duty to administer vaccines or to grant exemption.||The Department is required to supervise the immunization program, not administer vaccines. The Department is also required to promulgate regulations re the immunization program.|
|Texas||Leo Itz v. Vernon E. Penick, President of Fredericksburg Independent School District||1973||Supreme Court of Texas||Whether requiring school district to enforce compulsory immunization statute was unconstittuional.||Held: statute requires immunization of all persons as a prequisite to admission is constitutional. It permits exemptions and does not interefer with parental rights, equal protection, deny due process, invidiously discriminate, etc.||The District argues that the statute requiring enforcement of immunization mandates mirrors a state statute. Plaintiffs argue that Benjamin Franklin opposed compulsory innoculations, mandatory vaccinations were an assault on the body/cruel and unusual punishment and interferes with parental control and decisions relating to the halth of the children.|
|Wyoming||Susan LePage, Parent of Lisa LePage v. State of Wyoming, Department of Health||2001||Supreme Court of Wyoming||Whether the language of the state statute mandates the issuance of an exemption from immunization for schoolchildren upon a written religious objection or whether it permits an inquiry by the Department of Health into the sincerity of the religious beliefs of an applicant||Held: (1) Department of Health exceeded its statutory authority by inquiring into sincerity of mother's religious beliefs and (2) religious waiver was not required in order to exempt child from particular vaccination at issue.||The Department of Health argued that state law only permits a religous exemption, therefore the Department must review the asserted objection and determine whether it is based on sincerely held religious beliefs. The Department did not present any evidence that the number of religoius exemption waiver requests are excessive or insincere.|
|Wyoming||E. Keith Jones (minor), Craig Jones and Jacque Jones v. State of Wyoming Department of Health||2001||Supreme Court of Wyoming||Whether the Department of Health exceeded its authority by denying a student a request for a medical exemption from required immunizations.||Held: (1) Department had no authority to require student to receive Hep B immunization in order to attend school; (2) student was entitled to waiver from Department requirements that he receive a Hep B vacination in order to attend school; (3) Department exceeded its statutory authority by promulgating rule requiring student applying for a waiver from state immunization requirements to provide a reason for a medical contraindication to immunizations.||The Jones argue tha the statute requires only that a writing be produced which indicates that immunization is medically contraindicated. The Department of Health argues that the statute requires more than a simple statement that immunization is medically contraindicated. The Department argues that the statute requires the party requesting a waiver to present a specific, medically accepted contraindication to each specific vaccine before a waiver can be granted.|